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Abstract
The government debt-to-GDP ratios in the majority of euro area economies, including 
Spain, are at very high levels according to the available historical records. Economic 
research is conclusive in pointing out that bearing high levels of public debt ratios for 
an extended period of time can be damaging for economic growth. The economic 
literature also concludes that sustained high debt ratios create a source of vulnerability 
for the economy, in addition to lessening the stabilisation capacity of the public budget. 
Against this background, the reform of both the European Stability Pact and the Spanish 
budgetary stability law during the recent crisis strengthened the role of public debt in 
the budgetary framework. The simulations performed in this paper show that, under 
plausible macroeconomic assumptions, the public deleveraging process required by the 
Sustainability Pact for Spain will still imply a signifi cant fi scal consolidation effort that has 
to be sustained over time.
Keywords: public debt, fi scal consolidation, macroeconomic stabilisation.
JEL classifi cation: H63, E61, E62, H12.
Resumen
Los niveles de deuda pública sobre el PIB en una mayoría de países de la UEM, incluida 
España, se encuentran en niveles muy elevados de acuerdo con los registros históricos 
disponibles. La literatura económica es concluyente en señalar que el mantenimiento 
de ratios de deuda pública muy elevadas durante períodos temporales prolongados puede 
resultar perjudicial para el crecimiento económico y suponer una fuente de vulnerabilidad 
para la economía, además de reducir la capacidad estabilizadora del presupuesto público. 
En este contexto, las reformas del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento europeo y de la ley 
de estabilidad presupuestaria española acometidas durante la reciente crisis reforzaron el 
papel de esta variable en el marco presupuestario. Las simulaciones realizadas en el pre-
sente trabajo muestran que, bajo determinados supuestos macroeconómicos, un proceso 
de desapalancamiento público como el exigido por el Pacto de Estabilidad para el caso de 
la economía española exigirá un esfuerzo de consolidación fi scal todavía signifi cativo y 
que debe perdurar en el tiempo.
Palabras clave: deuda pública, consolidación fi scal, estabilización macroeconómica.
Códigos JEL: H63, E61, E62, H12.
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1 Introduction 
The recent economic and fi nancial crisis has prompted a substantial increase in the European 
Union (EU) countries’ general government debt to levels far higher than those in the period prior to 
2008. In Spain’s particular case, while the public debt-to-GDP ratio is on a slightly declining path, 
its levels remain close to 100% of GDP, the outcome of a rapid process of public deleveraging 
during the crisis. 
The economic literature stresses the problems that high public debt poses for economic 
activity. First, an economy’s growth capacity in the long term may be curtailed, insofar as public 
debt absorbs resources that might be used for more productive ends and alters the economy’s 
aggregate fi nancing conditions, distorting private investment decisions. Further, in the context 
of high public debt, fi scal policy may be affected by the need to sustain substantial primary 
surpluses that require higher tax levels or lower productive spending levels. At the same time, 
the room for countercyclical fi scal policy to tackle adverse macroeconomic shocks may be 
signifi cantly reduced. Also, high indebtedness creates greater vulnerability to changes in market 
investor sentiment. 
Against this background, this paper reviews the challenges associated with these high 
levels of indebtedness. Specifi cally, the following section describes the current levels of public 
debt for a broad set of advanced economies, and the determinants of recent developments in 
such debt. Further, past public deleveraging processes are reviewed to draw lessons for the 
future. The third section revisits the theoretical and empirical arguments that show the risks 
associated with sustained high levels of debt over extended periods of time. Also, the economic 
literature on the existence of limits on public debt levels above which those risks are exacerbated 
is summarised. The fourth section shows a set of tools that enable the vulnerability of public debt 
positions to be assessed, and their use for the Spanish case is illustrated. 
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2 Public debt from a historical perspective 
2.1 Recent developments in public debt 
The economic and fi nancial crisis has prompted a substantial increase in general government 
debt in the main euro area countries to levels far higher than those prevailing in the period 
immediately prior to 2008 (see Chart 1.1). The debt-to-GDP ratio stabilised broadly only 
recently, at a 50-year high, standing in 2017 for the euro area as a whole at slightly below 90%. 
This scenario is shared by other advanced economies, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, whose respective public debt-to-GDP ratios totalled 108.1%, 86.6% and 
240.3% in 2017 (see Charts 1. 3 and 1.4).1
Spain has likewise seen this worsening in public debt. In the case of the Spanish general 
government sector, the low starting level of public debt before the crisis (below 36% of GDP 
compared with 65% in the euro area in 2007) enabled the initial impact of the cyclical downturn 
and of the fi scal policy countercyclical measures to be absorbed. However, the continuing 
economic weakness and high budget defi cits, among other factors, placed the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at a peak of 100.4% in 2014 (a high of 94.2% for the euro area, also in 2014), marking an 
increase of 65 pp from the observed level in 2007 (compared with an increase of 29 pp of GDP 
in the euro area in the same period). Subsequently, this ratio has dipped slightly to around 98% in
2017, a level still higher than that of the euro area.2 As a result, the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
currently stands at levels not seen for over a century (see Chart 1.2). 
For analytical purposes, it is worth disaggregating the change in the debt ratio as a 
percentage of GDP into its fundamental factors: a) the level of the primary budget defi cit 
(the defi cit excluding interest payments), which needs to be fi nanced and, therefore, translates 
into an increase in debt; b) the interest charges generated by the public debt, which must also 
be fi nanced; c) the so-called defi cit-debt adjustment, and d) the change in nominal GDP, since an 
increase (decrease) in this variable automatically generates a reduction (increase) in the debt ratio, 
owing to the denominator effect of the ratio, in accordance with the expression that determines 
the dynamics of the public debt-to-GDP ratio, b, given by:
 
                       [1]
which is the habitual equation of the government’s budgetary constraint in a given year, t, where g 
denotes real GDP growth, π the infl ation rate measured by the GDP defl ator (such that γ t ≡ π t + g t 
is the change in nominal GDP), r the implicit nominal interest rate on debt,3 p the primary budget 
defi cit as a percentage of GDP, and add the defi cit-debt adjustment, also as a percentage of GDP.
1  The fi gures for 2017 mentioned in this section draw on the European Commission’s autumn 2017 projections for the 
European economies, and the IMF autumn projections for the United States and Japan.
2  For a detailed description of the changes in Spanish general government fi nances during the crisis, see Gordo et al. 
(2013), Delgado-Téllez et al. (2016) and Martí and Pérez (2015).
3  The nominal interest rate is assumed to be equivalent to the weighted average of the yields on the various debt 
instruments at different maturities.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC DEBT IN SPAIN AND IN THE MAIN ADVANCED ECONOMIES CHART 1
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For the euro area, in the period 2008-2014, the cumulative change in the debt ratio, 
calculated on the basis of [1], shows that the contribution of the primary balance to the increase was 
8.2 pp of GDP; that of the interest burden, 19.9 pp; and that of the defi cit-debt adjustment, 7.7 pp. 
Meantime, the nominal change in GDP reduced the ratio by 6.5 pp of GDP (see Chart 2.2). In Spain, 
the main determinant of the expansion of debt was the build-up of primary defi cits, responsible for 
40.3 pp of the increase in the debt ratio, while interest payments contributed 17.5pp, the defi cit-
debt adjustment 4.1 pp, and nominal growth, adverse in this case, made a negative contribution of 
2.8 pp (see Chart 2.4). In the Spanish case, the recent economic recovery has enabled the public 
debt ratio in the 2015-2017 period to be reduced (see Chart 2.3), while for the euro area as a whole 
the slight decline observed in the ratio is estimated to have been underpinned both by nominal 
growth and by the improvement in the primary balance (see Chart 2.1).
The ongoing increase in public debt during the crisis has run in tandem with a signifi cant 
reduction in private-sector debt in the Spanish case, while this latter variable is estimated to have 
stabilised in the euro area as a whole (see, once more, Charts 1.5 and 1.6). 
During the crisis, moreover, the general government sectors in the main advanced 
economies have incurred other explicit liabilities, going beyond the habitual concept of public 
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1  DEPENDENCY RATIO
Ratio of population aged over 65 to population aged 15-64
2013 2025 2040 2050
Change
2013-2050
Spain 26.8 34.7 54.3 62.3 35.5
Germany 31.8 40.7 55.6 57.4 25.6
United Kingdom 26.6 31.9 39.1 40.7 14.1
Netherlands 25.9 35.5 47.1 46.4 20.5
Belgium 27.1 32.0 37.2 37.9 10.8
France 27.9 36.1 44.1 43.7 15.8
Italy 32.8 37.3 50.2 52.9 20.2
EU-28 27.8 35.5 46.1 49.5 21.7
2  SPENDING ON PENSIONS, HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE
% of GDP
2013 2025 2040 2050
Change
2013-2050
Spain 18.7 19.1 20.5 21.5 2.8
Germany 19.0 20.8 22.9 23.7 4.6
United Kingdom 16.6 17.3 18.7 18.6 2.0
Netherlands 18.2 19.2 22.3 23.0 4.8
Belgium 19.9 22.1 24.3 24.5 4.6
France 24.6 25.2 25.0 24.2 -1.1
Italy 23.6 23.7 24.7 24.1 -0.4
AGEING AND CONTINGENT LIABILIITIES TABLE 1
SOURCE: Ageing Report 2015, European Commission.
CHART 3
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debt,4 including general government liabilities held by another general government unit and trade 
credits and other payables, which refl ect, among other elements, the deferrals in payments owed 
4 General government debt according to the excessive defi cit protocol (EDP): see footnote 1.
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by general government sectors to their goods and services suppliers.5 Associated with this 
defi nition is a second concept of debt, called “consolidated liabilities”, which coincides with 
that of total general government liabilities but in which those liabilities held by another general 
government unit are cancelled out. From this standpoint, consolidated general government 
liabilities stood, in the third quarter of 2017, in Spain and in the euro area, at 116% and 106.5% 
of GDP, respectively (see Chart 3).
Adding to the challenges arising from these high levels of public debt are those 
associated with the ongoing population ageing in the developed countries. Such challenges 
are expected to intensify in the coming decades and push certain public spending items such 
as pensions, health and care for the elderly upwards (see Table 1.1). In the European case, 
the European Commission regularly drafts a report in which it estimates the expected increases 
in various future expenditure items derived from population ageing. These estimates are 
based on a series of macroeconomic and demographic assumptions, taking into account the 
legislation in place at each point in time. According to the latest of these published reports, an 
increase in spending on pensions, health and long-term care of between 1.5-2 pp of annual 
GDP in the coming three decades is projected in Spain’s case, peaking at 3 pp of GDP in 2050 
(see Table 1.2) (European Commission 2015).6
2.2 Past experiences of public deleveraging processes
There have been many public deleveraging processes in the developed countries in the past in 
widely differing macroeconomic settings. Analysis of these episodes may prove worthwhile with 
a view to addressing the processes that the developed economies will have to undertake in the 
coming years. 
Specifi cally, the economic literature has analysed the causal factors that may be 
associated with the onset of public deleveraging processes [see Molnar (2012)], and the 
references cited therein]. According to the literature, a public debt-reduction process was more 
likely to be set in train in the past if, on one hand, general government budgetary conditions 
were fragile and/or were worsening in structural terms; and, on the other hand, if the domestic 
economy was evidencing a favourable dynamic (positive output gap).
Similarly, the international evidence available on the most recent episodes of a reduction 
in high debt levels in the advanced economies since the 1980s [see Abbas et al. (2013)] shows 
that, fi rstly, such episodes were more effective when they took place in economic upturns 
(see Chart 4). By comparison, other determinants of public debt dynamics, such as infl ation, 
lower interest rates or defi cit-debt adjustments, refl ected, for example, in privatisation 
processes or in the disposal of signifi cant fi nancial assets, contributed to the stabilisation 
and reduction of debt but played a secondary role. 
5  This is the broadest possible concept of debt, refl ected in the Spanish case in the Financial Accounts of the Spanish 
Economy (FASE), given that it encompasses all liabilities incurred by general government, irrespective of their nature. These 
liabilities are coined money, securities other than shares, investments, short- and long-term loans, in euro and in currencies 
other than the euro, trade credit and other accounts payable. For further methodological details, see Gordo et al. (2013).
6 See too, for the Spanish case, Ramos (2014) and Hernández de Cos et al. (2017).
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Nonetheless, although the contribution of macroeconomic fundamentals has been 
signifi cant and has marked the setting in which successful episodes of public deleveraging 
have tended to take place, the main factor for the success of such processes has generally 
proven to be the unfolding of a process of persistent reduction in the budget defi cit. Specifi cally, 
in 70% of the episodes analysed by Abbas et al. (2013), the average change in the primary 
balance during the debt-reduction process was 2% of GDP (see Chart 4). 
In the Spanish economy there is a relatively recent precedent of a public debt-reduction 
process, namely that relating to the emergence from the crisis in the 1990s. Specifi cally, from 
its 1996 peak of 65.6%, the public debt-to-GDP ratio embarked on a reduction that saw a 
decline of 30 pp of GDP in the period to 2007. This process occurred in a very favourable 
macroeconomic setting that was conducive to fi scal consolidation, with average real growth 
between 1996 and 2007 of 3.8%, average infl ation (measured by the GDP defl ator) of 3.6% in 
this period, and implicit rates on public debt which, though they stood on average over those 
years at 6%, fell during that period from 8% in 1996 to around 4% in 2007. If the accounting 
breakdown provided by the general government budgetary constraint [1] is used, 70% of the 
reduction in cumulative GDP terms in public debt net of fl ow-stock adjustments was due in 
that episode to the improvement in the primary budget balance, while the remaining 30% 
was on account of nominal growth higher than that of the interest burden (see Chart 6). In 
part, this improvement in the primary balance was due, in turn, to high nominal growth. As 
regards the improvement in the interest burden, of the 3.6 pp of GDP reduction in interest 
payments relative to GDP from 1996 to 2007 (from 5.2% to 1.9% of GDP), 2 pp were due to 
the effect of the reduction in implicit rates and 1.6 pp to the reduction in the volume of debt.
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3 Economic effects of high public debt
3.1 The costs of high public debt
The economic –principally empirical– literature shows that sustaining high levels of public debt over 
extensive periods is usually associated with lower economic growth7 (see, by way of illustration, 
Chart 7.1). This negative effect, according to the literature, would operate as from specifi c public 
7  See, inter alia, Reinhart et al. (2009), Abbas et al., (2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Eberhardt and 
Presbitero (2015), Sutherland et al. (2012), Afonso and Alves (2015) or Doménech and González-Páramo (2017).
SOURCE: Abbas et al. (2013). 
a Average values from four years for a sample of 30 countries in the 1980-2011 period. High (moderate) growth: real GDP 
growth of over 2% (between 0% and 2%) over four consecutive years (allowing the exception of one year). High (low) 
interest rate: rate higher (lower) than the median for each country (1980-2011 sample).
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debt ratios, of around 70%-90% of GDP, on average, for broad sets of countries. However, 
these studies offer an extensive variety of results, depending on the characteristics of the design 
of the empirical exercise, on the time period, or on whether emerging or developing countries 
are involved, among other factors [see, in particular, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011); Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012); Afonso and Alves (2015)].
Furthermore, this literature suggests that the effects on economic growth are determined 
not only by the level of debt but also by its attendant dynamics, meaning that the negative impact 
of a high level of public debt would be smaller in a context of debt reduction. At the same time, 
the evidence shows that the interaction of public debt levels and developments with national 
institutions and other idiosyncratic factors of the countries are signifi cant [see Pescatori, Sandri and 
Simon (2014); Chudik et al. (2017); Masuch, Moshammer and Pierluigi (2016); or Mendoza (2017)].
The main channels through which high public debt, or an adverse public debt dynamic, 
negatively affects economic growth operate through lower private investment and through the 
SOURCES: Eurostat, OECD and Banco de España.
a Regression with average values for the EU and OECD countries in the 1995-2015 period. Chart 7.3 shows, for the euro area countries, the correlation between 
their public debt ratio in 2015 and their primary balance commitments to 2025, in accordance with the criteria laid down in the European Stability and Growth 
Pact and their medium-term macroeconomic projections.
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distortionary effects of fi scal policy. As regards investment, high public debt exerts upward 
pressure on long-term interest rates (see Chart 7.2), increasing private-sector fi nancing costs and 
absorbing part of the fi nancing capacity generated by the economy (the crowding-out effect). 
That is to say, high public debt fi nancing needs might displace private-sector project fi nancing 
possibilities [Demirci et al. (2017)].
As to fi scal policy, in settings of moderate economic growth, maintaining a high level of 
public debt requires running high primary budget surpluses over extensive periods (see Chart 7.3). 
Attaining these primary surpluses might affect the economy’s potential growth insofar as they 
may come about at the cost of distortionary taxes or by cutting productive public spending. In 
addition, the debt burden associated with high debt drains resources persistently, giving rise to 
an opportunity cost in terms of economic growth in the use of the public budget. 
Higher levels of public debt entail greater fi nancing needs in the short term, which 
increases the vulnerability of the economy to adverse reactions by the fi nancial markets 
[see Borensztein et al. (2004); and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)]. This degree of 
vulnerability will depend not only on the level but also on the structure of public debt and on the 
magnitude of the budget defi cit, and overall this will determine fi nancing needs at a specifi c point 
in time [Missale (1997)].8 
The existence of high debt levels reduces the capacity to implement countercyclical 
fi scal policies. In this respect, there is evidence linking high public debt levels with the greater 
volatility of public revenues (see Chart 7.4), which might be associated with this diminished fi scal 
policy room. Furthermore, having less room to fi nance budgetary stimulus policies with a charge 
to public debt limits the capacity of fi scal policy to pursue discretionary measures needed at 
times of economic weakness. It should be borne in mind that the stabilising role of fi scal policy 
is particularly valuable for the euro area countries, which are part of a monetary union and whose 
monetary conditions and exchange rate cannot be adjusted to the idiosyncratic needs of each 
economy. Past experience shows that countries with lower debt levels, on average, evidenced 
higher degrees of automatic stabilisation of the budget, enabling them to soften the effects of 
economic fl uctuations on activity. Also, in the case of the EU countries, there appears to be a 
positive correlation between the intensity of debt-reduction processes in the post-Maastricht 
period and the degree of automatic stabilisation of budgets,9 which appears to suggest that 
healthier debt positions are usually associated with a higher degree of automatic fi scal policy 
responsiveness. 
Finally, public debt, insofar as it may be considered a low-risk asset, provides an 
alternative with a high degree of safety for the diversifi cation of agents’ saving. These two 
functions are more likely to be able to be exercised if, fi rstly, the level of public debt is such 
that it is perceived to be sustainable by national and international private agents alike, who will 
8 For the Spanish case see Pérez and Prieto (2015).
9   The degree of automatic stabilisation is habitually proxied by the sensitivity (elasticity) of the budget defi cit to changes 
in the output gap.
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retain their appetite to acquire the debt of the country in question; and, secondly, if there is room 
such that at times of crisis the debt may be increased without jeopardising the country’s public 
fi nances.10 
3.2 Public debt thresholds in practice and “debt limits”
The arguments set out in the foregoing section are the basis for justifying the imposition of 
legal reference values or limits on the level of debt in both the national framework and, in the 
European case, in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Indeed, the review of 
the EU economic governance framework during the crisis included a reform of the SGP,11 one 
of the main objectives of which was precisely to reinforce the disciplining role of the defi ned limit 
on public debt, namely 60% of GDP, assigning greater relevance to this variable in the corrective 
arm of the SGP throughout the budgetary oversight process, and defi ning more precisely the 
conditions under which situations of excessive debt, i.e. above the aforementioned ceiling, 
had to be corrected. Hence, following this reform, countries evidencing a debt ratio in excess 
of 60% of GDP shall be subject to the corrective mechanism of the SGP, unless the ratio is 
slowing at a satisfactory pace, which requires that, in the three years prior to the assessment, 
the debt must decrease by one-twentieth with respect to the amount by which it exceeds the 
reference value of 60% of GDP. The aim of this reform is to correct the fact that, despite 
the central role given in the initial design of the SGP to public debt as a key variable for measuring the 
sustainability of public fi nances, the limit thereon was largely ignored in the decades prior to 
the economic crisis, partly as a result of the absence of clear quantitative criteria for assessing the 
pace at which it should be reduced. 
In this same respect, the changes to the Spanish budgetary framework, initiated in 
September 2011 with the reform of the Constitution and its subsequent implementation in April 
2012 through the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (LOEPSF by 
its Spanish abbreviation), assigned greater importance to this variable. In particular, an explicit 
limit was established that was not envisaged in previous stability laws, whereby its weight in 
GDP may not exceed 60%, with a transitory period to 2020 being set for the application of this 
criterion.12 In this connection the legislation requires that the public debt-to-GDP ratio for each tier 
of government should be reduced at the necessary pace in annual average terms so as to attain 
this limit and, moreover, the path of reduction of the volume of debt should fulfi l the following 
requirements: 1) the change in the non-fi nancial expenditure of each tier of government may not 
exceed the Spanish economy’s real GDP growth rate; 2) when the national economy attains a 
real growth rate of at least 2% per annum or generates net employment with growth of at least 
2% per annum, the public debt ratio shall annually be reduced, at least, by 2 pp of GDP. Further, 
the rule gives absolute priority to the payment of public debt interest and capital expenses over 
other budgetary commitments, which may prove especially important for dispelling potential 
doubts over the state of public fi nances at times of fi nancial instability or deteriorating confi dence. 
10 See Hiebert et al. (2009).
11  Part of the so-called “Six Pack”. For further details on the SGP reforms implemented during the crisis, see Gordo and 
García Perea (2016), and Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2015).
12 See Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2013) for a discussion of the reform of the 2012 Budgetary Stability Law.
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The setting of an explicit numerical limit on the public debt ratio is not trivial. In Europe’s 
case, it should be recalled that the rationale behind the calibration of the legal reference limit 
of 60% of GDP defi ned in the SGP was that, in accordance with the macroeconomic situation 
prevailing in the early 1990s, this was the equilibrium level consistent with a situation of real 
GDP growth of 3%, an infl ation rate of 2% (the ECB’s medium-term objective) and a budget 
defi cit of 3% of GDP. If the equation [1] is taken as a starting point, with g = 3 %, π = 2% and 
d ≡ (r b – p) = 3% del PIB, the stationary solution in which b t = b t – 1 = b is such that b = 60% 
of GDP. In this respect, although this criterion is applied wholesale to all the EU countries, it is 
immediately apparent that a different macro-fi scal situation in one country might infl uence the 
selection of the reference value. In this simple example, to be able to maintain a debt reference 
level of 60% in a situation of real long-term growth of the economy below what was previously 
the case (e.g. 1%), the public balance consistent with the stationary solution would be –2% 
of GDP, instead of –3% as in the SGP, according to the expression d = – b γ / (1 + γ), where 
γ ≡ g + π is the nominal GDP growth rate.
Such a simple, static and deterministic exercise illustrates a key element that has 
been highlighted in the literature addressing the question of what the “public debt limit” acting 
as a reference for a country should be. And this limit depends on the country’s economic 
fundamentals. In the example, an economy with lower-than-average real growth would have to 
show a lower budget defi cit, on average, to maintain the same stationary level of public debt. 
This observation is consistent with international evidence showing high heterogeneity across 
different experiences: some countries have been capable of sustaining high levels of public debt 
relative to their output over time, retaining normal access to international markets in order to 
obtain funding, while others have had restrictively to hold these levels at lower values, to avoid 
liquidity or fi scal solvency problems, and to reduce the risks of having to make drastic budgetary 
adjustments in crisis situations. 
From this standpoint, the theoretical literature, in line with the previously reviewed empirical 
literature, suggests that, beyond the levels demanded by different budgetary frameworks, there 
are “prudent” public debt levels for each country above which that country would become more 
vulnerable and be subject to greater scrutiny by the fi nancial markets.13 Should lenders be able 
to analyse the current and future strength of an economy, the status of their public fi nances or 
the quality of national institutions, they would be in a position to impose stricter debt limits on 
countries with weaker and/or more volatile macroeconomic fundamentals.14 One set of papers, 
in particular, studies the determinants of the maximum level of debt that a country can allow itself 
without resorting to a default thereon, and the emergence of non-linear reactions to the proximity 
13  See, for example, Fall and Fournier (2015) and the references cited in this paper. This literature is different, but also 
related, to that which studies the “optimal” level of public debt. See Woodford (1990), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), 
Floden (2001) or Desbonnet and Kankamge (2007).
14  See, for example, Mendoza and Oviedo (2009) or Hiebert et al. (2009). Within this literature, in the particular case of 
developing countries, Reinhart et al. (2009) present the concept of “debt intolerance”, which becomes manifest in 
situations in which certain countries, despite posting moderate sovereign (external, in general) debt by developed 
countries’ standards, undergo episodes of extreme pressure. According to these authors, the “safe” thresholds for the 
external debt-to-GNP ratio for countries experiencing this intolerance phenomenon are low, at around 15% in some 
cases. These thresholds depend on the trajectory of each country’s (recurrent) arrears and infl ation.
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of that level, which may ultimately prompt explosive increases in the cost of debt.15 The idea of 
a “prudent” public debt-to-GDP ratio level has also been addressed in the literature that focuses 
on the development of indicators for the analysis of the sustainability of such debt.16 
However, no consensus has been reached on how to measure, in quantitative terms, 
these “prudent” levels or “debt limits”, largely because very few sovereign default episodes have 
been observed in the past, and those that did come about, moreover, were typically confi ned 
to emerging economies.17 According to the studies available, fi scal policy tended to react to the 
level of debt, more sharply so at times of serious budgetary stress, bordering on a situation of 
debt default. Hence, on the basis of this consideration, some authors have calculated the implicit 
debt limits that give rise to a vigorous reaction (see section 3.3), given that they would reveal 
the times at which governments were at the limit and reacted to prevent default [see Ghosh 
et al. (2013); and Fall and Fournier (2015)]. However, the heterogeneity of the values estimated in 
the different papers, and the very high values that are found,18 detract for the moment from the 
operational capacity of the prescriptions set out in this literature. 
As indicated in section 3.1, one of the adverse effects of sustaining a high level of 
public debt arises from the reduction in budgetary headroom for enabling fi scal policy to 
perform its stabilising function. In this respect, in the face of a high level of public debt, a 
trade-off may arise between debt reduction and automatic stabilisation. Specifi cally, though 
it might be optimal for an economy to reduce the level of public debt so as to allow greater 
cyclical sensitivity by the budget, the debt-reduction cost needed to attain this objective 
poses a problem of inter-generational distribution. The current generation ought to assume 
the transitory cost of convergence towards a new situation of low debt and greater cyclical 
insurance, with lasting benefi ts for other, future generations [see Hiebert et al. (2009)].
3.3 Fiscal policy reaction to the level of debt 
The evidence available shows that the fi scal authorities tend to react to the economic costs of 
high public debt and to the need to prevent unsustainable debt dynamics. Indeed, the empirical 
papers available, for a broad set of developed and emerging countries, fi nd evidence that 
fi scal policy has tended to react –drastically on occasions– at times of budgetary stress to high 
public debt values and/or slippage from the medium-term reference values for public debt. This 
reaction would thus have cancelled out the potential risks of non-sustainability associated with a 
signifi cant deterioration in macroeconomic and fi scal fundamentals, in the form of persistent and 
potentially explosive or unsustainable slippage from that reference level. 
15  Situated along these lines would be the papers that focus on the so-called “fi scal limit” (Bi, 2012; Bi and Leeper, 2013; 
Ghosh et al., 2013; Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013), and those that defi ne a “maximum sustainable level of the public 
debt ratio” (Collard, Habib and Rochet, 2015).
16  See García and Rigobon (2004) and Polito and Wickens (2011), who combine “Value at Risk” methodologies with the 
estimation of type [2] models such as those described in the text to develop indicators of the probability that debt will 
stand above a certain level in the future. Andrés et al. Rojas (2017), for their part, use this approach in order subsequently 
to calculate the “prudent” level of debt that maximises the correlation of these indicators with the sovereign debt spread 
between Spain and Germany, the benchmark measure of market sentiment. See also Berrittella and Zhang (2015).
17 The debt was, in many cases, denominated in foreign currency.
18  For example, Fall and Fournier (2015) show that Italy’s debt limit would stand at between 170% and 180% of GDP, that 
of Spain at 175%, and that of Ireland at 184%.
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The starting point for the formalisation of the “reaction function” is the acknowledgement 
that debt sustainability is a forward-looking concept. That is to say, in order to judge whether the 
current level of debt is sustainable requires making an assumption about the future behaviour 
of debt determinants. Specifi cally, on the basis of equation [1], it is obtained that the level of 
the debt ratio at time t should be covered by a future path, discounting primary balances 
such that:  
                                                     [2]
where . This expression is a standard one, obtained by iterating on 
equation [1], assuming for the sake of simplicity that the future defi cit-debt adjustments are zero. 
Moreover, debt sustainability at t requires that the net discounted present value of future public 
debt should converge on zero. That is to say, the level of debt may not grow at a greater pace 
than the discount rate, Λ, which incorporates the cumulative real growth of GDP in relation to 
the course of the real interest rate. In formal terms, this latter condition of transversality requires the 
second term on the right-hand side of expression [2] to converge on zero. The usual means 
of imposing the condition of transversality and excluding unsustainable debt paths involves 
postulating that the authority responsible for fi scal policy should react by altering one of the 
instruments at its disposal (whether public revenue or spending) to prevent explosive paths from 
materialising ex post. The reaction by the budgetary authority would come about in response to 
increases in the debt level. The canonical fi scal reaction function in the literature is formulated in 
terms of the changes that would be made to the primary budget balance (whether the actual or 
the cyclically adjusted balance) in response to changes in the level of public debt when the latter 
were to exceed a reference value or at specifi c times of fi scal stress:
                                               [3]
where X captures a set of control variables, in particular the output gap, which determines the 
cyclical component of the public budget, and ϕ 1 measures the intensity of the reaction, which 
should be such that ϕ 1 > 0 so that fulfi lment of the transversality condition is ensured. According 
to [3], the authorities would alter their primary balance in a discretionary manner to bound 
slippage by the debt level from the reference level. In practice, the authorities do not explicitly 
express the fact that they are adjusting to [3]-type rules. However, de facto, as earlier mentioned 
the literature has found that most authorities have implicitly behaved in such a way that an 
approximation can be made through expressions such as those described [see, for example, 
Bohn (1998); Checherita and Ždárek (2017); Plödt and Reicher (2015)].19
For the euro area (country panel), the papers available estimate values for the parameter 
ϕ 1 in the range of 0.02-0.10, depending on the assumptions of the estimated type-[3] model 
and on the sample used [see Berti et al. (2016)], i.e. an increase of 10 pp of GDP in public debt 
19  Drawing on the analysis of the stability of debt in macroeconomic models with fi scal rules of the type discussed in 
the text, different functional forms can be extracted that ensure debt sustainability [see Pérez and Hiebert (2004) for a 
discussion on this matter].
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would lead the authorities to implement policies that brought about an improvement in the euro 
area primary balance of between 0.2 pp and 1 pp of GDP. 
For the case of Spain, Legrenzia and Milas (2013) estimate a statistically signifi cant coeffi cient 
of ϕ 1 = 0.02, using a sample of annual data for 1970-2012. Lukkezen and Rojas Romagosa 
(2012), also with annual data, obtain values in the range between 0.02 (1946-2010 sample)
and 0.10 (1975-2010 sample), and Mauro et al. (2013), move in a similar range (0.03, 0.05 and 
0.07, respectively, for the 1950-2011, 1950-2007 and 1919-2011 samples of annual data)20 for 
different specifi cations. The literature evidences some dependence on the values estimated with 
respect to the sample period used and the empirical specifi cation. The estimates made with 
homogenous samples and quarterly data provide values in the lower part of the range discussed 
for the Spanish case (see Chart 8.1). Taking the last four decades as a reference, for which more 
homogenous macroeconomic data are available, the fi scal policy reaction would have been more 
vigorous in the data samples commencing in 1986 compared with those using data from 1970 
(an average of 0.03 against 0.02), and would have increased during the recent crisis (comparison 
of the samples ending in 2007 set against those including the latest years). As a result, it is 
estimated that in Spain’s case, on average, the reaction by the authorities to an increase in public 
debt of 10 pp of GDP leads to an increase of 0.2-0.3 pp in the primary balance.
Some papers [see Ghosh et al. (2013)] fi nd that this reaction by the authorities to the 
level of debt may be particularly vigorous at times of serious budgetary stress, close to a situation 
of debt default, although it would be subject to certain restrictions derived from “fi scal fatigue”, as 
from a certain high level of debt, while in normal periods the build-up of budgetary imbalances is 
not perceived as a fi rst-order problem for economic policy; accordingly, the fi scal policy reaction 
to such imbalances would be milder or even non-existent. These authors, therefore, argue that 
expression [3] would be non-linear in the level of debt, of the type:
                             [4]
For a panel of 23 advanced countries in the 1970-2008 period, and a relevant set 
of control variables (X), Ghosh et al. (2013) show that the coeffi cients of the cubic functional 
form ϕ 1, ϕ 2 y ϕ 3 are signifi cantly different from zero, with the expected signs ϕ 1 < 0, ϕ 2 > 0 
and ϕ 3 < 0, thereby validating the hypothesis that there is a reaction by the primary balance 
to past debt values, as from high levels of debt (quadratic term), but which slows as from very 
high values of the level of debt (cubic term), refl ecting what these papers call “fi scal fatigue”, 
derived both from policy restrictions (reduction in the support of the population to protracted 
processes of adjustment) and technical restrictions (exhaustion of the policy instruments available 
to achieve consolidation). Specifi cally, these authors fi nd that, for the set of countries in their 
sample, the marginal response by the primary balance to the lagged debt level falls in levels 
of around 90%-100% of GDP, and turns negative when the debt ratio draws close to 150%. 
These fi ndings support the hypothesis of Mendoza and Ostry, (2008) whereunder the risks 
20 See Mussons-Olivella (2018) for the analysis of regional government reaction functions in Spain.
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of sustainability increase as from very high levels of debt, given that the aforementioned “fi scal 
fatigue” phenomenon appears.  
For the Spanish case, the estimation of type-[4] reaction functions, for different quarterly 
samples, does not generally provide precise results from the statistical standpoint. In the particular case 
of the 1970Q1 2016Q4 sample, the coeffi cients obtained show the expected signs and are as follows:
 ϕ 1 = –0.006, ϕ 2 = 0.170, ϕ 3 = –0,00001, with ϕ 3 being signifi cantly different from zero at the 5% 
signifi cance level, while ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 show signs of statistical signifi cance on the edge of the usual 
levels. If these coeffi cients are taken as a reference, in the Spanish case the marginal response of 
the primary balance to the lagged debt level is an increasing one up to levels around 60%-70% 
of GDP, and diminishes in intensity as from those levels (see Chart 8.2). 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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4 Analysis of public debt sustainability
Given the risks associated with a high level of debt, it is important to have analytical tools enabling 
the sustainability of budgetary positions and the risks associated therewith to be assessed. The 
economic literature has developed various methodologies for making this assessment. In most 
cases, these methodologies seek to anticipate the dynamic of public debt in the future on the 
basis of a series of assumptions about their basic determinants. Three such methodologies are 
presented below and illustrated for the Spanish case.21, 22
4.1 Stochastic scenarios of developments in public debt 
An initial approach to the question of public debt sustainability can be made through the 
construction of probabilistic scenarios of the future course of public debt, devised on 
the basis of the estimated empirical relationship between the main determinants of public debt 
in the past. In particular, this stochastic analysis estimates a probability distribution of multiple 
macroeconomic scenarios subject to a high number of random shocks. This distribution enables 
a probabilistic analysis of potential public debt scenarios to be conducted. With this information it 
is possible subsequently to calculate the probability of public debt standing below a specifi c value 
throughout a simulation horizon and, as a result, to assign a risk to the probability distribution 
associated with the public debt dynamic. Specifi cally, using these statistical models, it is possible 
to calculate the probability of the debt-to-GDP ratio (b) standing, within a given number of years 
(T), above a reference value (θ), given the information available (I t – 1) in the current quarter (t).  
We denote this probability as . The procedure followed for its calculation is, 
after Andrés et al. (2017), as follows. First, a vector auto-regressive (VAR) model is recursively 
estimated, Y t = μ y + β t + B(L) Y t – 1 + u t, where Y t is a vector with the determining variables 
of the debt ratio, i.e. real GDP growth, infl ation measured with the GDP defl ator, the implicit 
nominal interest rate on the debt, and the primary budget defi cit as a percentage of GDP, 
excluding the defi cit-debt adjustment which is an erratic and unpredictable component. μ y and 
t are deterministic terms (constant and trend), and u t is the vector of reduced-form residuals 
which are assumed to be distributed according to a multinomial distribution with zero mean and 
variance and covariance matrix Ω. In our case, the model is initially estimated on a sample for the 
1970Q1-2007Q4 period, with a quarter being recursively added until completing the estimate 
with the 1970Q1-2017Q4 sample.  
21  Leading international institutions in the fi scal policy area usually translate sets of indicators similar to those presented 
in the various sub-sections of section 4, along with additional ones, onto a numerical scale of risks, habitually 
summarised on a colour palette, running from least to most risky. The aggregation of the signals extracted from each 
indicator provides the so-called “indicator of risk to public debt sustainability” (DSA). In this respect, see, for example, 
European Commission (2014), International Monetary Fund (2011) and Bouabdallah et al. (2017). While clearly of use 
for explaining and monitoring fi scal sustainability risks, the preparation of these synthetic risk indicators is, nonetheless, 
not free from methodological problems and largely arbitrary assumptions, in particular regarding the selection of the 
thresholds that defi ne the risk categories for the different indicators, and in the translation of very different indicators to 
a homogenous numerical scale, which is moreover then aggregated.
22  Another type of commonly used tool to anticipate public fi nances unsustainability risks are the so-called “fi scal stress 
early warning systems” [see Schadler (2016), or Hernández de Cos et al. (2014)]. These systems draw on a tradition 
of models used to anticipate foreign exchange and banking crises, and employ historical data from crisis episodes to 
identify variables with leading-indicator properties as far as the identifi cation of imminent crises are concerned.
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Second, once the parameters of the foregoing model have been estimated (including the 
variance and covariance matrix), a high number of Montecarlo simulations (5,000) are performed 
at horizon T, and the corresponding realisations of the debt-to-GDP ratio are calculated on the 
basis of expression [1], assuming that the defi cit-debt adjustment takes a zero value in each year 
of the forecasting horizon. The sequential estimation of the VAR models and the calculation of 
the simulated paths for public debt [1] generate, for each point in time, a distribution function 
of debt levels, which depends on the simulation horizon T, and is denoted as . Hence 
.
The results of applying this methodology to Spain and to the euro area are discussed 
below.23 Chart 9 shows for Spain the probabilities of the debt ratio, b, exceeding the value 
of 60% over a 10-year horizon, calculated with the samples that take as the last year 
(source of the forecast), recursively, 2007Q4, 2008Q1, …, up to 2017Q4, i.e. the sequence of 
probabilities . In the Spanish case, the probability calculated in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 whereby public debt would stand below 60% of GDP in the following decade (2017) 
was zero. At that point in time, the context was supposedly favourable from the standpoint of public 
fi nances, with a debt level of 35.6% of GDP, fi scal accounts that were posting a primary surplus 
of 3.5% of GDP, and real (year-on-year) GDP growth of 3.8%. This probability increased to 15% in 
just one year, in 2008, and stood slightly above 90% at end-2009. The brighter macroeconomic 
outlook associated with the recovery phase that began in 2013 has progressively reduced the 
probability, despite the fact that the public debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen only marginally. However, 
on the information available to 2017 Q4, the probability was still at high levels, of around 75%, 
meaning that only in 25% of the simulations performed would debt stand below the threshold of 
60% of GDP at the end of the coming decade. When this exercise is conducted for the probability 
that debt will stand below the 90% threshold in 10 years, this probability falls to 25%, i.e. in three 
out of each four simulations debt stands below that value in 2027. 
23  The data for the euro area aggregate are taken from the European Central Bank’s AWM database (macroeconomic 
variables) and Paredes et al. (2014) (fi scal policy variables), and Spanish data from the National Accounts (INE) and 
from De Castro et al. (2018).
SOURCE: Banco de España, using the model of Andrés et al. (2017). The chart shows the probability calculated in the fourth 
quarter of each year. 
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For the case of the euro area, despite recording a debt level that is lower by almost 
10 pp of GDP in 2017, currently a far higher probability is calculated, between 90% and 100%, 
owing to the recent worse relative behaviour of the macroeconomic fundamentals compared with 
the Spanish case. From a backward-looking standpoint, the probability for the euro area of public 
debt standing above 60% of GDP in 2017, which is calculated taking the fourth quarter of 2007 as 
the starting point, was lower than 30%. This probability increased to 15% in only one year, in 2008, 
and stood practically at 100% as from end-2009. On the information available to 2017Q4, debt 
would not be expected to be lower than its reference value (60%) in the coming decade. 
In any event, the limitations of this type of stochastic analysis should be stressed, arising 
essentially as they do from the fact that the probabilistic scenarios are constructed on the basis 
of the past empirical relationships between the relevant variables. Insofar as these empirical 
relationships are modifi ed in the projection scenario, as a result, for instance, of a reaction by the 
authorities to the increase in public debt being different from the reaction in the past, the paths 
traced by these scenarios would also be affected.
4.2 Deterministic scenarios for debt: with exogenous assumptions
An alternative for analysing the sustainability of a specifi c public debt situation involves constructing 
deterministic scenarios for public debt developments based on ad hoc assumptions about 
the course of the main macroeconomic and fi scal variables determining such developments. 
Specifi cally, assumptions about the expected course of fi scal policy (budget defi cit), the economic 
growth path, prices and the economy’s fi nancial conditions in the simulation horizon are required. 
It is usual in this type of exercise to construct a baseline scenario, which is subjected 
to a sensitivity analysis modifying the assumptions about the expected course of the main 
magnitudes that determine developments in public debt. The assessment of the sustainability of 
public debt on the basis of these projections can be made by calculating, for example, the fi scal 
adjustment that would be needed to reduce public debt to a specifi c reference level over a given 
time horizon, or simply by analysing the dynamics of the projected public debt and comparing 
its level at the end of the projection horizon with a reference (e.g. the SGP’s 60% of GDP). 
Specifi cally, starting with the basic framework that provides the government budgetary constraint 
(equation [1] above), if it is assumed, for instance, that GDP growth and the interest rate hold 
constant over a specifi c horizon and that the defi cit-debt adjustments are zero, the constant 
primary budget defi cit, , needed to reduce public debt in N years, from the current level, b T , to 
a reference level, , would be given by the standard expression [see Escolano (2010):
                            
[5]
The necessary primary balance depends, therefore, on the average nominal interest 
rate assumed for the period and on the nominal growth of the economy (real and prices), which 
determine the differential r – γ, of the starting level of public debt, and of the number of years 
considered for attaining a specifi c reference value.
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By way of illustration, Table 2 presents the results of calculating the primary balance 
(as a percentage of GDP) that certain euro area countries would have to maintain to place the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio at 60% in 10 years, under the assumption that the nominal GDP growth 
rate will stand at the average for the past decades (average for 1995-2017) and the implicit rate 
on debt at the average for the most recent period of expansionary unconventional monetary 
policy (the average for 2014-2017).24 In the case of the euro area, the reduction in the next 10 
years in the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the 2017 level of 89.3% to 60% would be attained by 
maintaining a primary surplus of 2.6% of GDP, on average, in 2018-27, under the assumption 
that the nominal GDP growth rate will stand, on average, at 3.1% (average for 1995-2017) and 
the implicit rate on debt at 2.6% (average for 2014-2017) (see Table 2). This primary fi scal surplus 
is signifi cantly higher than that observed in the recent past (0.4% of GDP in the 1995-2017 period, 
1.2% in 1995-2007) and that estimated for 2017 (0.9% of GDP). In Spain’s case, the reduction 
in the public debt ratio from the European Commission’s forecast last autumn for 2017 of 98.4% 
to 60% in the next decade would require, under the above-mentioned macro-fi scal assumptions 
(see Table 2 once more), that a constant primary surplus of 2.9% of GDP be maintained, 
24 The data for 2017 are taken from the European Commission’s November 2017 estimates.
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which is a more demanding value than the historical fi gure for the pre-crisis period (1.7% in 
1995-2007), and substantially higher than that estimated by the European Commission for 2017, 
namely –0.6% (a primary defi cit).
In the foregoing exercise the term over which the simulated reduction in the public debt 
ratio is considered is crucial, given that it conditions the effort needed, which in turn depends 
on the macro-fi nancial situation in the fi scal adjustment period. For example, in the case of the 
euro area, under the assumptions of real GDP growth, infl ation and interest rate described in 
the previous paragraph, a sustained primary balance similar to the historical pre-crisis balance, 
of 1.2% of GDP (average 1995-2007), would allow debt to be reduced to 60% in two decades, 
towards 2037 (see Chart 10.1). In Spain’s case, with assumptions about better macroeconomic 
fundamentals than in the euro area on average (i.e. with a lower r – γ differential), despite the 
starting point in 2017 being a debt-to-GDP ratio that is 9 pp higher, the maintenance from 2017 
to 2030 of a primary balance similar to that observed, on average, in the previous expansionary 
period (1.7% of GDP, higher than that for the euro area) would enable the debt reference value to 
be attained, approximately, in the latter year (see Chart 10.2).
SOURCES: European Commission (AMECO) and Banco de España.
a Primary balance needed on average in each period to reduce public debt to 60% of GDP from its level in 2017, in the time horizon referred to. The baseline 
scenario assumens that nominal GDP growth stands in the debt reduction period at the average value for the 1995-2017 period, while the nominal interest 
Q@SDHR@RRTLDCSNADDPT@KSNSGD@UDQ@FDENQ3GDRBDM@QHNNEGHFGDQQ@SDRDMS@HKR@HMBQD@RDNMSGDA@RDKHMDRBDM@QHNjFTQD3GDC@S@
are the European Commission's Novermber 2017 projections.
b The nominal implicit interest rate holds in all the scenarios on average in the 2014-2017 period.
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The changes in the macroeconomic assumptions also signifi cantly alter the results of 
the simulations. Better (worse) macro-fi nancial assumptions would require a smaller (bigger) 
primary surplus to achieve the same debt reduction objective. For example, in the case of the 
euro area aggregate, an implicit interest rate 50% higher than that assumed in the baseline case 
(3.9%, the average for 1999-2017) would involve having to maintain a primary surplus 38% 
higher (3.5 pp of GDP compared with 2.6 pp) in order to achieve the same debt goal of 60% in a 
decade. In the Spanish case, higher (by 50%) interest rates than those assumed in the foregoing 
baseline scenario, with the remaining assumptions holding constant, would delay convergence 
by the public debt ratio on the 60% level by a decade (see Chart 10.2 once more). 
The results are also very sensitive to the assumptions about the economy’s nominal 
growth rate. For instance, in the case of Italy, which posts a very high debt-to-GDP ratio (132% of 
GDP in 2017), sustaining a primary surplus equal to the historical one (3.1% of GDP) would, if 
the implicit nominal rates on debt are held at 2.5%, allow 60% to be attained in one decade, 
two decades or three decades, with nominal GDP growth of 7%, 3% and 2%, respectively 
(see Chart 10.3). That is to say, nominal growth that is higher by 1 pp over two decades would 
enable the consolidation time to be reduced by one decade, with the same budgetary effort. 
The illustrative exercises discussed do not take into consideration the effects on economic 
growth and infl ation that would be brought about, fi rst, by the maintenance of these primary 
surpluses over a prolonged period and, on the other, the effects that the deleveraging process 
would have on interest rates. Nor do they show the real degree of effort required to attain a specifi c 
budgetary position, because no distinction is drawn between the cyclical component of the budget 
defi cit, which would be corrected by macroeconomic developments, and the structural component, 
whose correction requires discretionary measures. These considerations can be incorporated into 
the analysis by broadening the analytical framework, which is what is done in the following section. 
4.3 Deterministic scenarios for debt: with a behaviour model
This section broadens the foregoing simple framework of analysis, based on the equations [1] 
and [5], with an additional set of behavioural relationships. The fi rst, equation [6], captures the 
effect of changes in the fi scal policy stance, measured on the basis of the change in the primary 
structural balance, , as a percentage of nominal potential GDP , on real economic 
growth, g, given by the fi scal multiplier β 1 [see, inter alia, Warmedinger et al. (2015)]:
                            [6]
where ρ measures the persistence of the growth in real output, which in turn is found anchored 
to the growth of real potential output, . Furthermore, the situation of the output gap, O t, conditions 
the rate of expansion of output, meaning that in each period a fraction β 2 of the gap closes. 
Equation [6], fi nally, includes an inverse standard relationship between the changes in the interest 
rate, r, and growth. To complete the notation, the output gap is defi ned as: 
                                                       [7]
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where Y t = (1 + g t ) Y t – 1 denotes the level of real output, and  t = (1 +  t )  t – 1 that of potential 
real output, while the budget balance as a percentage of nominal GDP, P t Y t, is defi ned as the 
sum of the structural balance and the cyclical balance, ,
                                                    [8]
where the cyclical balance is defi ned as a proportion (elasticity, ϵ) of the output gap
                                                             [9]
The second basic equation of the extended model is a Phillips curve, which links the 
course of the infl ation rate with the degree of slack in the economy, measured by the output gap, 
and infl ation expectations, which weight the recent past and the ECB’s medium-term objective, π0,
                        [10]
Finally, some persistence is incorporated into the nominal interest rate, given by φ r , 
which refl ects the hysteresis that is introduced into the dynamic of the implicit rate on public debt 
by its term structure, and a term that measures the impact of new long-term issues, with the rate 
, and short-term issues, with the rate :
                                        [11]
where the long-term rate is affected by the situation of the country’s public fi nances, measured by 
the distance between the balance and public debt with respect to their medium-term references: 
                                         [12]
while the short-type rate is determined taking as a reference the long-term rate: 
                                                 [13]
Hence, the improved public fi nances situation leads to an improvement in the interest 
rate at which the debt is fi nanced and, therefore, in the payment of interest thereon. 
The basic calibration of the model’s parameters given by [1]) and [6] to [13] is taken from 
Warmedinger et al. (2015), Laubach (2009), Balducci and Kumar (2010), Álvarez and Urtasun (2013), 
Broussard et al. (2012), Bouabdallah et al. (2017), and own calculations based on the data for the 
Spanish economy: ρ = 0.5 (persistence of output); β 1 = 0.55 (average fi scal multiplier of a combination 
of instruments on the revenue and expenditure side); β 2 = 0.20 (closing of the output gap); 
β 3 = 0.5 (elasticity of the change in rates on growth);  t = 1.5% (constant in the simulation 
horizon); ϵ = 0.45 (elasticity); ϑ 0 = 0.3 (anchoring of infl ation to its medium-term objective); 
ϑ 1 = 0.1 (infl ation response to cyclical slack); τ d = 0.15 (impact of a 1% of GDP increase 
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in the defi cit-to-GDP ratio on the long-term interest rate of government debt); τ b = 0.02 (impact 
of a 1% of GDP increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio on the long-term interest rate of government 
debt); φ r = 0.8 (persistence of the implicit rate, whereby 20% of the debt is rolled over each year); 
 = 0.2 (weight of short-term debt, with a residual maturity of less than one year). So as to 
be able to calculate the backward-looking component of infl ation, the increasing path of 
prices forecast by the Eurosystem in the December 2017 projections exercise is assumed for 
2017-2019. Also taken for these years are the paths of short-and long-term interest rates 
forecast in that exercise.
With this model and given the calibration set out, some of the simulations of the previous 
section can be performed again and the results compared. Specifi cally, in a similar way to the 
beginning of this section, the constant fi scal effort (per annum) needed to reduce the public debt 
ratio from the level of 98.4% of GDP forecast by the European Commission for 2017 (the case 
of Spain) to 60% in 10 years (2027) is calculated, but taking into account moreover the costs in 
terms of GDP growth of this fi scal consolidation strategy. The main conclusions of the analysis 
are as follows (see Table 3). 
First, in line with the beginning of this section, the reduction in public debt towards the 
60% reference in the next 10 years would require a signifi cant, constant, annual structural effort 
of 0.83 pp of GDP in 2018-2027, with a fi scal multiplier β 1 = 0, consistent with maintaining on 
average a primary balance in 2018-2027 of 2.9% of GDP, with mild convergence towards that 
value by the primary balance derived from the model, from –0.6% in the base year 2017. In 
cumulative terms, general government interest payments would fall by 0.9 pp of GDP, which 
provides budgetary headroom that could be used to mitigate the structural effort needed.
If the channel comprising the macroeconomic impact of the consolidation given by a 
multiplier25 with a standard value, β 1= 0,55, is activated, the fi scal effort needed to attain the 
same debt target in 2027, namely 60%, is 0.3 pp higher in terms of additional structural effort 
25  The fi scal multipliers depend on the time at which the adjustment is made or the composition thereof, among other 
factors. For example, they are higher at times of economic recession or high unemployment, and they are lower at 
times of budgetary or fi nancial stress [see Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito (2016); Lamo et al. (2016)].
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DETERMINISTIC SCENARIOS: PACE OF REDUCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
(PARAMETERISATION FOR SPAIN)
TABLE 3
SOURCE: Banco de España. The values for 2017 are European Commission estimates (November 2017).
a Change in the structural balance per annum, in percentage points of potential GDP.
b Growth in potential GDP of 2.5% in 2017-2026 (1.5% in baseline scenario).
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per annum compared with the previous case, up to 1.1% of GDP, and the average primary balance 
required would rise to 3.6% of GDP, given the adverse effects on economic growth. Further, in 
this latter case, if the economy’s potential growth were to be 1 pp higher than the assumption 
in the baseline scenario (2.5% compared against 1.5%), the debt-improvement process would 
be signifi cantly affected, meaning that a structural fi scal effort of 0.97 pp of potential GDP per 
annum would be required, as with the maintenance of an average primary surplus in 2018-2027 
of 2.7% of GDP (see Table 3 once more). It is worth mentioning that if the fi scal multiplier were 
higher, e.g. β 1= 1.25, the fi scal structural adjustment per annum needed to reduce debt to 60% 
would be even higher, at 1.9% of GDP per annum, causing high persistence in the negative 
output gap generated by consolidation, and holding infl ation very low, which would translate into 
a very subdued nominal GDP path that would hamper, in turn, the ongoing reduction of debt. 
Indeed, in this case, the public debt-to-GDP ratio does not begin to fall until 2022.
Lastly, in the context of the previous model, Chart 11 presents hypothetical scenarios 
of developments in public debt in the coming decade, under the assumption that the fi scal 
adjustment is tailored to the SGP requirements of convergence towards the so-called “medium-
term objective” (MTO) (for Spain: zero structural balance), whereby an annual structural effort 
(change in the structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP) of 0.5 pp of potential GDP is 
made until this objective is attained.26 In a scenario in which potential growth of 1.5% and a fi scal 
multiplier of 0.55 are assumed, fulfi lment of the MTO would entail a cumulative reduction in the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio of around 10 pp in the coming decade, so that this ratio would stand 
slightly below 85% in 2027. Under the SGP framework, as discussed in section 3.2, there is 
–in addition to convergence on the MTO– a rule on convergence towards the reference of 60% of 
GDP; as a result, the countries with a debt ratio higher than this value should reduce, on average, 
26  On the latest European Commission estimates (November 2017), the Spanish general government structural public 
balance is expected to stand in 2017 at close to 3.5% of GDP.
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their debt by a proportion of 1/20 of the amount by which this reference value is exceeded. If it 
is imposed on this previous scenario that this additional rule should be met, on average, in the 
coming decade, the degree of fi scal adjustment needed per annum would be higher, at 0.6 pp, 
and public debt would stand at close to 80% of GDP in 2027, some distance nonetheless from 
the SGP reference value of 60%. Chart 11 also presents a scenario in which higher potential 
growth, of 2.5%, is assumed. In this case, the economy’s greater dynamism would enable the 
MTO to be attained and the debt rule to be met with an annual fi scal adjustment of 0.5 pp, 
reducing debt to a value slightly below 80% of GDP. 
It is further worth noting that the simulations presented evidence the diffi culty of meeting the 
conditions set in the fi rst transitory provision of the LOEPSF on the transitory period of convergence 
towards the reference values set by this legislation, values that are in line with those set in the SGP, 
i.e. 60% for the overall general government sector. According to this Provision, the public debt-to-
GDP ratio for each tier of government shall be reduced at the necessary pace on an annual average 
basis so as to reach this aggregate limit in 2020.27 The attainment of the objective in 2020 from the 
current levels, which are slightly higher than 98% of GDP, would require a reduction in the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of close to 40 pp in three years, an even greater effort than that of the previous 
public deleveraging process from 1997 to 2007 (see section 2.2), which provided for a reduction of 
about 30 pp in somewhat over a decade in what was a very favourable macroeconomic context. 
In this respect, in line with the recommendations of the AIReF (the Spanish Independent Authority 
for Fiscal Responsibility), it might be best to use the appropriate legal mechanisms to extend the 
transitory period for the fulfi lment of the limit set out in the LOEPSF, adapting the requirements 
specifi ed in the fi rst transitory provision of this legislation and defi ning a credible and demanding 
reference path for the sustained reduction of the debt ratio, consistent, in any event, with the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact.28
In sum, the analytical approach in this section has helped illustrate the orders of magnitude 
and the channels through which a reduction in public debt would operate should it come about: 
degree of fi scal effort, composition of fi scal effort (which affects the multiplier value), macro-fi nancial 
conditioning factors (economic growth in the short and long term, and interest rates), initial level of 
debt, objective of the public deleveraging process and the interactions that may arise between 
these determinants. There are other signifi cant aspects, which have been omitted in this section 
for the sake of simplicity, such as the private-sector debt situation, the prevailing monetary policy 
reaction, and the combination of fi scal policy with other, structural reforms that might smooth the 
public fi nances readjustment process [in this respect see, inter alia, Banco de España (2017), 
Arce et al. (2016) and Andrés et al. (2016)].
27  Moreover, certain additional requirements are set out for the transition phase, under normal conditions: (i) the change 
in the non-fi nancial uses of each tier of government may not exceed the Spanish economy’s real GDP growth rate; 
(ii) as from the time at which the national economy attains a real growth rate of at least 2% per annum or generates 
net employment with growth of at least 2% per annum, the public debt ratio will annually decline, at least, by 2 pp 
of GDP; (iii) the overall general government structural defi cit will decline, at least, by 0.8% of national GDP in annual 
average terms; however, in the event of an Excessive Defi cit Procedure, the reduction in the defi cit will be adjusted to 
what the EDP demands.
28  See the AIReF report dated 20 July 2016: “Sobre el cumplimiento esperado de los objetivos de estabilidad 
presupuestaria, deuda pública y regla de gasto 2016 de las AAPP”.
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5 Conclusions
Public debt levels relative to GDP in a majority of euro area countries are at very high levels 
according to the historical records available. In Spain’s case, despite the slight reduction in the 
past three years, public debt as a proportion of GDP stood at around 98% in 2017, i.e. at levels 
not seen for more than a century. Adding to the challenges arising from these high levels of 
public debt are those associated with the ongoing population ageing in the developed countries. 
These challenges are expected to intensify in the coming decades and exert upward pressure 
on specifi c public spending items such as pensions, health and care for the elderly.
The economic literature is conclusive in highlighting that maintaining very high public 
debt ratios over prolonged periods may be harmful to economic growth and entail a source of 
vulnerability for the economy, in addition to reducing the stabilising capacity of the public budget. 
The literature also suggests that the effects on economic growth are determined not only by the 
level of debt but also by the attendant debt dynamics, whereby the adverse impact of a high 
public debt level would be diminished in a context of debt reduction. 
The international evidence available on past episodes of reductions in public debt 
in the advanced economies since the 1980s shows that, although the contribution of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals has been signifi cant, the main factor for the success of these 
processes has usually been the implementation of a signifi cant fi scal consolidation process. 
Against this background, the reforms to the European and Spanish fi scal frameworks, 
set out in the SGP and the LOEPSF, respectively, have tended to strengthen the disciplining 
role of the defi ned limit on public debt. Specifi cally, the SGP now accords greater signifi cance 
to this variable throughout the budgetary surveillance process, and the conditions under which 
the correction of excessive debt situations (i.e. above the aforementioned reference limit) should 
come about are more precisely defi ned. Further to this reform, then, the countries with a debt 
ratio higher than 60% of GDP will be subject to the corrective mechanisms of the SGP, unless 
the debt moderates at a satisfactory pace, which will require, in the three years prior to the 
assessment, that debt should be reduced by a proportion of 1/20 of the amount by which it 
exceeds the reference value of 60% of GDP. Along these same lines, the LOEPSF also included 
the explicit limit of 60% of GDP, which was not envisaged in the previous stability laws. 
The simulations performed in this paper show that a public deleveraging process such 
as that required by the SGP for the case of the Spanish economy will require a still-signifi cant 
and durable fi scal consolidation effort. Specifi cally, given the level of public debt relative to GDP 
in 2017 and the European Commission’s estimates of the Spanish general government structural 
defi cit for that year, and on the basis of nominal average economic growth assumptions for the 
coming decade of 3% and of implicit interest rates on public debt of 2.5%, the fulfi lment of this 
objective will call for an average primary surplus of 0.8% of GDP, compared with the 2017 defi cit 
estimate of 0.6% of GDP. That would enable the public debt-to-GDP ratio to stand at slightly 
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over 85% in 2027. Average real GDP growth 1 pp higher than that set out in this scenario would, 
with the remaining assumptions holding, allow a public debt-to-GDP ratio close to 80% in 2027 
to be attained, or, where appropriate, it would provide for achieving a public debt-to-GDP ratio 
such as that of the previous scenario but with a signifi cantly smaller fi scal effort. Specifi cally, 
in this latter case, the average primary surplus needed would be 0.2% of GDP, 0.6 pp per 
annum below that of the baseline scenario. The simulations illustrate the importance of pursuing 
the fi scal consolidation process and of accompanying it with the structural reforms needed to 
increase the economy’s growth capacity. 
Lastly, these simulations evidence the diffi culty of meeting the conditions set out in 
the fi rst transitory provision of the LOEPSF, which would oblige the public debt-to-GDP ratio to 
stand below 60% in 2020. In this respect, it would be warranted using the legal mechanisms 
envisaged in the LOEPSF to extend the transitory period in order to attain the aforementioned 
limit, defi ning a credible and demanding path of reduction for the public debt ratio consistent with 
the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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